The events on the ground, and the words spoken by the two candidates should cause one to question the wisdom of both men.
Sen. McCain seems to not understand the importance of the change in tactics..or at least his public proclaimations emphasizes only the numbers.
Sen. Obama, on the other hand, was intent on declaring the surge as "not working", and gave the impression that nothing could possibly work.
My problem with the timetable for withdrawal is thus:
Is it motivated by a desire to "get out" (in which case, it is a moral blunder, and is bound to be a disastrous strategic move), or is it motivated by a desire to do the right thing (i.e., to help the Iraqis, as per our obligations).
My belief is that the timetable for withdrawal (and the concomitant vision of an "over the horizon" force) is borne out of a desire to pull out and minimize US casualties, and the justification (i.e., it will help the Iraqis) is being offered to justify it after the fact.
I should also point out that the strategic vision of an "over the horizon" force runs counter to an Army that secures the population and lives amongst the people.
We are not far apart here, I just see the presence of US forces in an ambiguous role vis a vis the sovereign government of Iraq as a net negative in the region and, as I mentioned, the negotiated withdrawal of US troops as both an encouragement of the Iraqis to get their act together and an extension of the same political tactics as Petraeus is using on a national, not regional, level.
Our responsibility to Iraq is genuine but extends to encouraging them to shape their own destiny, the sooner the better.
As for the 'over-the-horizon' force, I see that more as part of a broader strategy of taking the fight to the Al-Qaeda franchise wherever it appears in South West Asia, not as part of a counterinsurgency strategy for Iraq. Outside of some 'fire brigade' operations at Iraqi request I'm not sure where they would fit in to Iraq's long term plans and I'm guessing they would prefer them 'over-the-horizon' than in their own country for domestic political reasons, which seems more to the point. It is debatable just how much traction Al-Qaeda was ever going to get in Iraq in the first place, while acknowledging we gave them a golden opportunity to make mischief there in our mishandling of the post-invasion administration and security operations.
Is it possible that your objections come down to, dare I say it, 'nit-picking' in the context of an overall strategy which you largely agree with? Don't forget Obama has promised USD$2B for repatriation of refugees, I haven't heard anyone else discussing that.
Well, my objective in discussing these issues with you (and with others) is not to come to an agreement. I think we disagree on basic strategic goals, and that our disagreements are beyond nitpicking on tactics.. they are on what should be, and what are strategic our strategic goals.
However, the objective is not to resolve those strategic differences. If you have studied the facts as well as you can, and if you have thought about the options, and the possible consequences as well as you can, then whatever conclusion you arrive at is the right conclusion; and I hope you will stick to those conclusions as well as you possibly can.
I hope you will say the same for me...specially for those occasions when we disagree on strategic goals.
Regarding the strategic goals themselves, I think that an over the horizon force meant for taking the fight to Al Quaeda is morally incomplete...because it does not provide the local population with security.
The Iraqi government right now is beholden by a desire to eliminate the Sunni problem minus American interference. That is essentially why the Sunnis dont want an American withdrawal, and the Shias do. They have understood the "majority rules" aspect of democracy, but have not yet understood the "minority rights" obligations that comes with it. Until that happens, it is the moral obligation of American soldiers to provide the security.
If you have provided for Iraqi security, you can then devote additional resources to taking the fight to AQI. I think you will find, however, that it is not necessary to take the fight to AQI if you provide for Iraqi security.... and that AQI will wither on the vane by itself, if you provide for Iraqi security.
Having said all that, I should once again reemphasize: you have obviously read about this problem, and thought about this problem a lot (and perhaps more than I have), so whatever conclusions you have arrived at are the right ones...
Your arguments are persuasive, to a degree. However, where I disagree with you is on the matter of security for the Iraqi populace. This is the responsibility of the Iraqis. As long as we are there, they will not have to assume that responsibility. If we don't set a timeline then we will be going along until a day suddenly comes when we can say, "Ok, we can leave now." With a timeline, they will be forced to step up and assume responsibility. The Iraqis are not children that need the guidance of the more mature USA.
The argument "Iraqis are not children.." can just as well be applied to Afghans. And I am guessing you support the deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan, even though they too, will not step up and assume responsibility in the presence of US troops.
US troops in Iraq are not there to provide guidance ~ they are there to provide security, so that the Iraqis can fix their own house.
As a matter of fact, I do favor putting more resources into Afghanistan. It has been neglected for too long. We need to put more resources into rebuilding the country. We also need to put more effort into capturing bin Laden. That will require more troops.
I am really enjoying this discussion because you raise some excellent points and obviously have a good handle on the situation. But let's leave aside the philosophical correctness of our respective musings on the subject and look at it as an exercise in international politics involving two nations, because sure as eggs there is going to have to be one solution which is acceptable to both parties and their respective populations.
We certainly do have a responsibility in Iraq, and I admire your strength of purpose in sticking so strongly to that view, but I'm not sure it extends to healing the Sunni/Shi'a schism. That would be a historical task, indeed. I see that there is a problem, one unfamiliar to Americans I might add, regarding the respective Sunni and Shi'a populations, not to mention the Kurds, and how they achieve equal representation in their newly minted government. In some respects the Westminster parliamentary system, where the executive branch is subsumed in the legislative, and the Prime Minister governs only so long as a coalition of minority parties is supportive of his administration, is more appropriate to resolving this dilemma than our own strongly executive model. Therein lies the hope of the Sunnis, and Kurds, in achieving an equitable balance of power. Should we permit 'ethnic cleansing' of Sunni populations? Of course not, though a fair bit of it has already occured on our watch. But at what point do we take a hands off approach and let Iraqi politics assume it's normal centre of gravity? Sooner rather than later I'm thinking. Consider, again, in a broader context Lawrence's own words which you so appropriately quoted:
Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is. It may take them longer and it may not be as good as you think, but if it is theirs, it will be better.
Well, it is their 'peace' too, and Lawrence was no stranger to the kind of sectarian bickering which informs so much of the problem Iraq faces.
My position remains that these are issues which would have arisen in any case in the absence of an authoritarian central government, at what point are these considered historical factors outside the scope of a US occupation?
There are other mitigating factors, too. If we could create a situation where the bulk of the educated, middle-class Sunnis who have fled Iraq are motivated to return and take up their appropriate role in the public service and private sector perhaps they would provide a reasonable counter-balance to the apparent Shi'a majority.
I am just wondering at what point you see US responsibility fulfilled? It is my belief that our continued presence there is affecting both the development of their own autonomy and the balance of power within their own political environment. We won't really know how it is going to fly until we step away at least a few paces.
Well, I too am enjoying our discussion. The philosophical tirade in the last comment was precipitated by your "nit-picking" remark, but I will refrain from any more philosophical tirade in the future. You ask an important question: at what point does American obligation end, and at what point Iraqi responsibility begin.
In order to answer that question, we have to first establish a framework:
(a) whether or not American obligation extends further, or whether it ends now, is irrespective of American resources (specially when more resources can be raised), and the need to allocate those resources elsewhere.
(b) I could quote Mother Theresa ("you give until you have no more to give, and then you give some more until it hurts, and then you give some more...", or something to that effect) but that would not apply here... American obligation does end at some point. It is important to keep this in mind, but to not raise it as a pretext either.
(c) The point at which American obligations will end will come a lot sooner if the obligation is recognized in the first place.
Having said all that, I recognize that you feel that American obligations have already ended, and that a withdrawal is in the best interest of all parties concerned. My philosophical tirade is warranted at this point: I know you have studied the problem, and have arrived at this conclusion honestly; and so I have no disagreements with you (even though we disagree). My problem is with the average American, who favors a pullout because a pullout is the lazy option.
Now, where do I feel American obligations end ? I feel that American obligations extend well into the future, and to a point where Iraqis (Shia, Sunni and Kurd) are able to cobble together a reasonably satisfactory power sharing agreement, and are able to co-exist with only an occassional bloodbath.
A semi-relevant example would be the British presence in India. When they left, there was a bloodbath and a forced migration of millions...tens of millions. That happened even though the Indians were quite demonstrably ready to stand on their own feet. You could say that the British left too soon ~ in fact, they delayed their presence well beyond the appropriate time, using fears of Hindu-Muslim strife, and their perceived obligations to the Muslim subjects to justify their stay. Their continued presence, and their willingness to promote Hindu-Muslim strife to justify their presence, increased the magnitude of the calamity that occured when they left.
US presence will not "solve" the Shia-Sunni strife. But it is not a problem that needs to be "solved"... Shia and Sunni have coexisted fairly harmoniously for over 1000 years..just like Hindu and Muslim had coexisted in India for over 1000 years. It is not the continued presence of the occupying Army that is the problem, but the behavior of that occupying Army ~ if the occupier exploits the differences (as the British did), then the problem becomes worse. If the occupier acts like a super class (as the American Army was doing under Gen Casey), then the problem becomes worse. If the occupier acts to secure the local population, and keeps the interests of the local population at heart (as the American Army appears to be doing under Gen. Petraeus), then they are not making the problem worse..they are heroes.
And I absolutely agree with you about parliamentary democracy being more appropriate to Iraq.
Well, firstly, I don't think that American obligations have ended but that they may well do over the course of the sixteen months Obama is talking in terms of, allowing, as he said, for changing situations 'on the ground' and, I'm assuming, in the houses of parliament as well. So no we're not there yet but I am delighted to hear the narrative emerging about 'political' rather than military solutions. And I further agree it isn't a matter of our 'resources,' however finite, or patience, which seems in even shorter supply. In fact, I fully accept your formula of 'to a point where Iraqis are able to cobble together a reasonably satisfactory power sharing agreement, and are able to co-exist with only an occasional bloodbath.' No problems there.
But the point of mine you seem to be avoiding is that the very act of negotiating a withdrawal settlement, as opposed to seeking a Status of Forces Agreement, is part of the broader political strategy which you admire so much in Petraeus' counterinsurgency, and I not only cite Lawrence in this defence, but others:
Insurgencies and counterinsurgency strategies are, at their very core, all about domestic politics....Maliki's recent declaration was not, as John McCain would have you believe, just the Iraqi government playing politics. Instead, it was a genuine attempt by the Iraqi government to increase its legitimacy with its people -- a critical element of counterinsurgency. One of the main factors limiting the Iraqi government's credibility with its own people is its complete dependence on the United States. Maliki's declarations were meant to limit that perception and shore up domestic support. After coming out so strongly and publicly for a gradual American withdrawal, the Maliki government has made it all but impossible to walk back. If it were to now sign an agreement that did not include some specific target dates for withdrawal or that tried to preserve the permanent South Korea-like presence that John McCain has long advocated, it would be seen by its own people as a weak American puppet instead of the legitimate government that it must become. Ilan Goldenberg - Counterinsurgency: It's All About the Politics Democracy Arsenal 23 Jul 08
Ilan Goldenberg - Counterinsurgency: It's All About the Politics Democracy Arsenal 23 Jul 08
That's pretty much what I've been trying to articulate here myself, it's all connected. You would probably enjoy the longer piece in the American Prospect. But at the crossroads of your 'well into the future' and my sixteen months, more or less, the partition of India rears it's head. I had a feeling we were going to end up there, somehow. And the analogy has some weight, former feudal monarchies released from an authoritarian power to devolve into ethnic conflict. But we're not talking about partitioning Iraq, are we? I must say, as an aside, that was the only thing I ever heard Biden suggest that I truly objected to, when it was mooted. This is a horse of a different colour, and while the parallels are ominous and the perils are genuine I think the already demonstrated nationalism of the Iraqis, of all factions, will hold together in the promising, one might even suggest prosperous, position they will inherit in a threatening and dynamic region.
And I must also say this is one of the most satisfying exchanges I have had in this forum for ages, thanks.
I will reply in more detail, but I have short comment.
Biden was my guy, but I objected to his "partition" plan...for the reason that you alluded to !
I agree that it is possible that the act of negotiating a US withdrawal will force the Shias, Sunnis and Kurd to negotiate a settlement. But I have 2 problems with the concept:
(1) I think it is unlikely that a withdrawal timetable will force reconciliation. A much more likely scenario is for the Shias and the Sunnis to figure that they can take care of the ethnic problem once the Americans leave. Under this scenario, it would be immoral to insist on a withdrawal. Sen. Obama hedges for this scenario by invoking a "conditions on the ground clause", but point number (2) would make this hedge very difficult to implement
(2) The second point is a question of motivation. Are you (not you personally, but Sen. Obama and his political support) insisting on a withdrawal timetable because it is the right thing to do (i.e., it will force settlement talks amongst Iraqis), or are you insisting on a withdrawl timetable because it is the convenient (and lazy) thing to do.. and then invoking the "Iraqis will be forced to negotiate a settlement amongst themselves" as a rationale for your lazy option ? If it is the latter (and I strongly believe it is the latter), then you will ignore the conditions on the ground clause, and figure out a way to pull out anyways. In any case, it will be very difficult for Sen. Obama to insist on his "conditions on the ground" clause if the people who elected him will accept noting less.. and I fear that to be the case.
Note, I am not questioning Sen. Obama's motivation in presenting a timetable. I do not know his motivation ~ maybe he has studied the problem honestly (like you have), and arrived at the same conclusion as you did. My suspicion is that is not the case, but that suspicion is based solely on the fact that he is a politician, and his conclusion is very much in sync with public demands. But regardless of his motivation, it will be very difficult for him to alter the withdrawal schedule he has proposed...the conditions on the ground be damned.
As an aside, I should point out that the machinations of the current Al-Maliki government, which (as you pointed out) is striving to demonstrate independence from it's American benefactors, is not that different from the machinations of an earlier Iraqi government beholden to another foreign benefactor.
If you strongly believe that Sunnis and Shi'as intend to take care of the ethnic problem once the Americans leave then it is hard to imagine a scenario in which we ever do, no matter what the conditions, and that neglects my point about our presence as occupiers being a regional irritant and a deterrent to Iraqi political self-respect and autonomy. It begins to sound like you favour the long term South Korean model McCain has mooted, which I think is totally unacceptable on a whole range of other grounds I wasn't expecting to have to discuss here.
And as for your second point, on the intention of Obama and his supporters, I can only say that I have come to my position on this almost entirely through reading Obama's voluminous platform and public remarks on the issue, that it has been clearly making these same arguments all along, and that you have seem to have found an objection based on your subjective reading of the motivation of the candidate and his supporters which informs your opposition to a stand it seems you mostly agree with in principle if not in detail. From where I sit this is a subtle variation of the 'empty suit' narrative which was so fashionable in the primary campaign and which I would have thought, by now, was largely untenable.
But never mind, I reckon sixteen months is a very sensible framework from which to operate and it is a good compromise between the realities of the situation in Iraq and the strong aspirations of a large segment of the American electorate, one which would give Obama a clear mandate but plenty of wriggle room. And really, with al-Maliki, not to mention Sistani, supporting a withdrawal for domestic political reasons, which is a blessing of considerable magnitude, why would we hesitate to take the opportunity to start down the road to withdrawal and rehabilitation.
And we haven't even touched on one of Obama's strangest arguments in justification of a draw-down in Iraq, namely, our resources are urgently required elsewhere.
Incidentally, if your diaries, which I enjoy very much, were just a little less adversarial toward Obama I would be happy to recommended them. I'm guessing you and I are the only ones still here and that's a pity, really.
...strongest arguments...
Well, I am not trying to be adversarial to Sen. Obama. I have tried to maintain a respectful tone towards him (and towards Sen. McCain as well), while delving into issues without regard to how it appears. On some issues (like FISA), I have sided with him and against most of the community here. At the same time, I do realize that this is a progressive blog, and I am not expecting very many recs for writing diaries that are critical of the Democratic nominee.. in fact, I am quite grateful that my account has not been taken down already.
As to your argument, it appears that you bypassed my point.
If I did believe that the Shias and the Sunnis would always, and forever, intend to fix the ethnic problem once the Americans left, then it would truly be hard to imagine any scenario in which a pullout would be justified. However, I did not say that ~ I said that (or left unsaid), at this point, they intend to take care of the problem, and so it is hard to imagine a pullout at this point. At the same time, I do not believe in a long term presence (and I suspect, neither does Sen. McCain, if you go by his pullout by 2013 statements). I thought I made that clear when I said Mother Theresa dictum (you give, and you give some more until it hurts, and then you give some more...) does not apply. US obligations will end at some point, regardless of whether the Shias and the Sunnis are ready to coexist. But that point has not been reached, and neither are the Shias and the Sunnis ready to live together yet.
I had thought that you would refute my argument by stating your belief that the Shias and the Sunnis (and the Kurds) are willing to work together right now, and the reasons for that belief.. because, in the end, that is the only way to justify a pullout. I do not believe that the Shias and the Sunnis are able to work together right now because Iraq's Doctors/Engineers/Lawyers are either internally or externally displaced, and the ones that remain have a strong motivation for revenge. Not enough time has elapsed from when the killings have ended...not enough time for healing.
I understand your point about US presence being a regional irritant. US presence will be a regional irritant regardless of whether you station troops in Iraq (which you oppose), or move them to Afghanistan (which you support). How do you explain the inconsistency in that position ?
In my opinion, the presence of foreign troops is a regional irritant only when they act like foreign troops (i.e., like an occupying army bent on promoting the interests of the occupying power while ignoring the needs of the local population). American troops are not resented (or at least, not resented as much) in Germany, or Korea, for instance. The role you suggest (redirect US troops for the war on terror in Afghanistan) is consistent with a more occupying role ~ because you would take troops that are currently providing Iraqi security, and use them for your other strategic objectives that are, for the most part, inconsistent with the wishes of the local population. How would you explain that ?
And finally, I thought we had agreed that the extent of US obligations is independent of US resources. Thus, I was surprised to see you quote the strongest arguments in justification of a draw-down in Iraq, namely, our resources are urgently required elsewhere
Well it sounds like we agree on the purchase but are just haggling over the price. I say sooner, you say 'well into the future,' I reckon my position is stronger because our bargaining position is viable now and the Iraqis are claiming their readiness. How can you argue with that? It's their country.
And as for the argument that the Iraqis are willing to work together right now, I made the point up-thread that they have a nationalistic tradition which crosses ethnic boundaries and mutual interests, not least of which their potential prosperity, in a threatening and dynamic region.
Sounds to me like we disagree on whether the point has not been reached where the responsibility of their own security can be transferred to the sovereign government of Iraq, which is largely subjective, especially in the polemic climate of our national debate on the subject. I think sixteen months, more or less, will suffice, especially given the Iraqis would know that a withdrawal in on the cards. You disagree and I can't see us resolving this impasse in any reasonable manner here.
And the presence of our troops is not merely a regional irritant but a domestic Iraqi one, which may go some way to explaining the logic of the Afghanistan deployment. And it does not have a viable government emerging which has the support of a majority or it's citizens. Afghanistan requires the same counterinsurgency prescription you outline in this very diary, it has a multi-national mandate for it's execution and it is still adjacent to the region where the genuine threat to the safety of our citizens is harboured and continues to operate against us. Perhaps we will leave the dilemma of the frontier region and Pakistan for another discussion but it is a challenge that we need to confront with our undivided attention and best efforts. We are losing that battle at the moment for the lack of application of the very principles you highlighted in your diary. This must change.
Thank you!!
For the complement, and for the discussions...which I too have thoroughly enjoyed.
I will repeat... I disagree with you, but I have no disagreements with you because I fully respect the process by which you have arrived at your conclusions!!
