Well, firstly, I don't think that American obligations have ended but that they may well do over the course of the sixteen months Obama is talking in terms of, allowing, as he said, for changing situations 'on the ground' and, I'm assuming, in the houses of parliament as well. So no we're not there yet but I am delighted to hear the narrative emerging about 'political' rather than military solutions. And I further agree it isn't a matter of our 'resources,' however finite, or patience, which seems in even shorter supply. In fact, I fully accept your formula of 'to a point where Iraqis are able to cobble together a reasonably satisfactory power sharing agreement, and are able to co-exist with only an occasional bloodbath.' No problems there.
But the point of mine you seem to be avoiding is that the very act of negotiating a withdrawal settlement, as opposed to seeking a Status of Forces Agreement, is part of the broader political strategy which you admire so much in Petraeus' counterinsurgency, and I not only cite Lawrence in this defence, but others:
Insurgencies and counterinsurgency strategies are, at their very core, all about domestic politics....Maliki's recent declaration was not, as John McCain would have you believe, just the Iraqi government playing politics. Instead, it was a genuine attempt by the Iraqi government to increase its legitimacy with its people -- a critical element of counterinsurgency. One of the main factors limiting the Iraqi government's credibility with its own people is its complete dependence on the United States. Maliki's declarations were meant to limit that perception and shore up domestic support. After coming out so strongly and publicly for a gradual American withdrawal, the Maliki government has made it all but impossible to walk back. If it were to now sign an agreement that did not include some specific target dates for withdrawal or that tried to preserve the permanent South Korea-like presence that John McCain has long advocated, it would be seen by its own people as a weak American puppet instead of the legitimate government that it must become. Ilan Goldenberg - Counterinsurgency: It's All About the Politics Democracy Arsenal 23 Jul 08
Ilan Goldenberg - Counterinsurgency: It's All About the Politics Democracy Arsenal 23 Jul 08
That's pretty much what I've been trying to articulate here myself, it's all connected. You would probably enjoy the longer piece in the American Prospect. But at the crossroads of your 'well into the future' and my sixteen months, more or less, the partition of India rears it's head. I had a feeling we were going to end up there, somehow. And the analogy has some weight, former feudal monarchies released from an authoritarian power to devolve into ethnic conflict. But we're not talking about partitioning Iraq, are we? I must say, as an aside, that was the only thing I ever heard Biden suggest that I truly objected to, when it was mooted. This is a horse of a different colour, and while the parallels are ominous and the perils are genuine I think the already demonstrated nationalism of the Iraqis, of all factions, will hold together in the promising, one might even suggest prosperous, position they will inherit in a threatening and dynamic region.
And I must also say this is one of the most satisfying exchanges I have had in this forum for ages, thanks.
I will reply in more detail, but I have short comment.
Biden was my guy, but I objected to his "partition" plan...for the reason that you alluded to !
I agree that it is possible that the act of negotiating a US withdrawal will force the Shias, Sunnis and Kurd to negotiate a settlement. But I have 2 problems with the concept:
(1) I think it is unlikely that a withdrawal timetable will force reconciliation. A much more likely scenario is for the Shias and the Sunnis to figure that they can take care of the ethnic problem once the Americans leave. Under this scenario, it would be immoral to insist on a withdrawal. Sen. Obama hedges for this scenario by invoking a "conditions on the ground clause", but point number (2) would make this hedge very difficult to implement
(2) The second point is a question of motivation. Are you (not you personally, but Sen. Obama and his political support) insisting on a withdrawal timetable because it is the right thing to do (i.e., it will force settlement talks amongst Iraqis), or are you insisting on a withdrawl timetable because it is the convenient (and lazy) thing to do.. and then invoking the "Iraqis will be forced to negotiate a settlement amongst themselves" as a rationale for your lazy option ? If it is the latter (and I strongly believe it is the latter), then you will ignore the conditions on the ground clause, and figure out a way to pull out anyways. In any case, it will be very difficult for Sen. Obama to insist on his "conditions on the ground" clause if the people who elected him will accept noting less.. and I fear that to be the case.
Note, I am not questioning Sen. Obama's motivation in presenting a timetable. I do not know his motivation ~ maybe he has studied the problem honestly (like you have), and arrived at the same conclusion as you did. My suspicion is that is not the case, but that suspicion is based solely on the fact that he is a politician, and his conclusion is very much in sync with public demands. But regardless of his motivation, it will be very difficult for him to alter the withdrawal schedule he has proposed...the conditions on the ground be damned.
As an aside, I should point out that the machinations of the current Al-Maliki government, which (as you pointed out) is striving to demonstrate independence from it's American benefactors, is not that different from the machinations of an earlier Iraqi government beholden to another foreign benefactor.
If you strongly believe that Sunnis and Shi'as intend to take care of the ethnic problem once the Americans leave then it is hard to imagine a scenario in which we ever do, no matter what the conditions, and that neglects my point about our presence as occupiers being a regional irritant and a deterrent to Iraqi political self-respect and autonomy. It begins to sound like you favour the long term South Korean model McCain has mooted, which I think is totally unacceptable on a whole range of other grounds I wasn't expecting to have to discuss here.
And as for your second point, on the intention of Obama and his supporters, I can only say that I have come to my position on this almost entirely through reading Obama's voluminous platform and public remarks on the issue, that it has been clearly making these same arguments all along, and that you have seem to have found an objection based on your subjective reading of the motivation of the candidate and his supporters which informs your opposition to a stand it seems you mostly agree with in principle if not in detail. From where I sit this is a subtle variation of the 'empty suit' narrative which was so fashionable in the primary campaign and which I would have thought, by now, was largely untenable.
But never mind, I reckon sixteen months is a very sensible framework from which to operate and it is a good compromise between the realities of the situation in Iraq and the strong aspirations of a large segment of the American electorate, one which would give Obama a clear mandate but plenty of wriggle room. And really, with al-Maliki, not to mention Sistani, supporting a withdrawal for domestic political reasons, which is a blessing of considerable magnitude, why would we hesitate to take the opportunity to start down the road to withdrawal and rehabilitation.
And we haven't even touched on one of Obama's strangest arguments in justification of a draw-down in Iraq, namely, our resources are urgently required elsewhere.
Incidentally, if your diaries, which I enjoy very much, were just a little less adversarial toward Obama I would be happy to recommended them. I'm guessing you and I are the only ones still here and that's a pity, really.
...strongest arguments...
Well, I am not trying to be adversarial to Sen. Obama. I have tried to maintain a respectful tone towards him (and towards Sen. McCain as well), while delving into issues without regard to how it appears. On some issues (like FISA), I have sided with him and against most of the community here. At the same time, I do realize that this is a progressive blog, and I am not expecting very many recs for writing diaries that are critical of the Democratic nominee.. in fact, I am quite grateful that my account has not been taken down already.
As to your argument, it appears that you bypassed my point.
If I did believe that the Shias and the Sunnis would always, and forever, intend to fix the ethnic problem once the Americans left, then it would truly be hard to imagine any scenario in which a pullout would be justified. However, I did not say that ~ I said that (or left unsaid), at this point, they intend to take care of the problem, and so it is hard to imagine a pullout at this point. At the same time, I do not believe in a long term presence (and I suspect, neither does Sen. McCain, if you go by his pullout by 2013 statements). I thought I made that clear when I said Mother Theresa dictum (you give, and you give some more until it hurts, and then you give some more...) does not apply. US obligations will end at some point, regardless of whether the Shias and the Sunnis are ready to coexist. But that point has not been reached, and neither are the Shias and the Sunnis ready to live together yet.
I had thought that you would refute my argument by stating your belief that the Shias and the Sunnis (and the Kurds) are willing to work together right now, and the reasons for that belief.. because, in the end, that is the only way to justify a pullout. I do not believe that the Shias and the Sunnis are able to work together right now because Iraq's Doctors/Engineers/Lawyers are either internally or externally displaced, and the ones that remain have a strong motivation for revenge. Not enough time has elapsed from when the killings have ended...not enough time for healing.
I understand your point about US presence being a regional irritant. US presence will be a regional irritant regardless of whether you station troops in Iraq (which you oppose), or move them to Afghanistan (which you support). How do you explain the inconsistency in that position ?
In my opinion, the presence of foreign troops is a regional irritant only when they act like foreign troops (i.e., like an occupying army bent on promoting the interests of the occupying power while ignoring the needs of the local population). American troops are not resented (or at least, not resented as much) in Germany, or Korea, for instance. The role you suggest (redirect US troops for the war on terror in Afghanistan) is consistent with a more occupying role ~ because you would take troops that are currently providing Iraqi security, and use them for your other strategic objectives that are, for the most part, inconsistent with the wishes of the local population. How would you explain that ?
And finally, I thought we had agreed that the extent of US obligations is independent of US resources. Thus, I was surprised to see you quote the strongest arguments in justification of a draw-down in Iraq, namely, our resources are urgently required elsewhere
Well it sounds like we agree on the purchase but are just haggling over the price. I say sooner, you say 'well into the future,' I reckon my position is stronger because our bargaining position is viable now and the Iraqis are claiming their readiness. How can you argue with that? It's their country.
And as for the argument that the Iraqis are willing to work together right now, I made the point up-thread that they have a nationalistic tradition which crosses ethnic boundaries and mutual interests, not least of which their potential prosperity, in a threatening and dynamic region.
Sounds to me like we disagree on whether the point has not been reached where the responsibility of their own security can be transferred to the sovereign government of Iraq, which is largely subjective, especially in the polemic climate of our national debate on the subject. I think sixteen months, more or less, will suffice, especially given the Iraqis would know that a withdrawal in on the cards. You disagree and I can't see us resolving this impasse in any reasonable manner here.
And the presence of our troops is not merely a regional irritant but a domestic Iraqi one, which may go some way to explaining the logic of the Afghanistan deployment. And it does not have a viable government emerging which has the support of a majority or it's citizens. Afghanistan requires the same counterinsurgency prescription you outline in this very diary, it has a multi-national mandate for it's execution and it is still adjacent to the region where the genuine threat to the safety of our citizens is harboured and continues to operate against us. Perhaps we will leave the dilemma of the frontier region and Pakistan for another discussion but it is a challenge that we need to confront with our undivided attention and best efforts. We are losing that battle at the moment for the lack of application of the very principles you highlighted in your diary. This must change.
Thank you!!
For the complement, and for the discussions...which I too have thoroughly enjoyed.
I will repeat... I disagree with you, but I have no disagreements with you because I fully respect the process by which you have arrived at your conclusions!!
